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ABSTRACT – The article gives a critical assessment of the emergence, development and 
consolidation of the administrative capacity criteria for entering the European Union (EU). The 
administrative capacity criteria emerged for the first time during the 5th European Enlargement 
(2004-07) under soft political conditionality, showing a limited impact. The criteria gained importance 
during the accession process of Croatia, reflecting some changes in EU enlargement policy in order to 
address the specificities of the Western Balkan countries. The article concludes that these criteria today 
have become a central part in the new EU enlargement strategy, posing strict conditions to be fulfilled 
by all candidate countries if they want to proceed in their path towards the EU. It will be sustained 
that this reorientation represents a major change in the nature of EU enlargement policy. 
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Introduction 
This article aims to give a critical assessment of the emergence, development and 
consolidation of the administrative capacity criteria for entering the European Union (EU). It 
analyses how the EU has started to apply some specific accession conditions for influencing 
domestic changes in public administration of candidate countries, not in relation to a specific 
EU policy area but in relation to the general – or horizontal – administrative structures of a 
candidate country. The administrative capacity criteria emerged for the first time during the 
5th European Enlargement (2004-07) under soft political conditionality, they gained 
importance during the accession process of Croatia, and by now have become a central part 
in the new enlargement strategy of the European Commission which aims in particular to 
address the specificities of the Western Balkan countries. 
The emergence and consolidation of administrative capacity criteria has been a real path 
breaking issue in EU enlargement policy for several reasons: (1) It has opened a new area of 
direct influence of the EU that is not traditionally associated with EU competences and that 
had never been involved in previous enlargements – the administrative capacity criteria are 
not part of the acquis communautaire, the main body of EU legislations; (2) It has cast an 
                                                     
1Ph.D. in Politics, Human Rights and Sustainability, Florence, Italy, m.bonomi@alumni.sssup.it. 
2
  
Economic Analysis (2015, Vol. 48, No. 1-2, 1-18)
  
unprecedented attention to the implementation phase of the reform strategies in candidate 
countries – the adoption of new legislations represents, in fact, just a first step for 
modernizing public administrative systems; (3) It has brought about a reorientation of EU 
enlargement policy – since the pursuing of the administrative capacity criteria needs a high 
priority within the agenda of the European Commission in order to have some chances to 
succeed. 
All these reasons have made the application of the administrative capacity criteria a very 
innovative policy within the EU enlargement strategy but, at the same time, they are also 
responsible for the limited impact in regards to Central East European and Baltic countries 
(CEEBs). While the success of EU conditionality depends mainly on both (a) the costs of 
domestic adaptation and (b) the external push of the EU (Börzel and Risse 2003), the 
application of administrative capacity criteria represents a case of extreme variation 
regarding both factors: (a) proceeding towards a comprehensive reform of the domestic 
administrative system implies very high political and material costs for internal political 
actors; and (b) a consistent application of EU conditionality in this field and the credibility of 
the threat of denying membership upon these criteria, the two most important elements 
determining the strength of EU external push, have faced several problems. In fact, the 
absence of an administrative acquis rendered the task of defining common standards in this 
field particularly difficult, while denying membership on this basis was at odds with other 
EU goals. 
The limits that emerged in the application of the administrative capacity criteria during 
the 5th EU enlargement are, however, at the basis of the actual reorientation of the EU 
enlargement policy. For addressing the specificity of Western Balkans, the European 
Commission has renewed its attention regarding the administrative capacity criteria, which 
have become today a central part of the new enlargement strategy. This new strategy aims to 
reinforce the credibility of EU transformative power and tries to overcome the shortcomings 
of the past in applying the administrative capacity criteria through three fundamental 
improvements: (1) By giving high priority to administrative criteria within the agenda of the 
Commission – that have become, together with the rule of law and economic governance, 
one of the three pillars of the new EU enlargement strategy (European Commission 2014); (2) 
By providing a new framework for both benchmarking performances and guiding local 
policy-makers in the reform process – with a strong focus on implementation phase of the 
administrative reforms (OECD 2014); (3) By the introduction of Special Groups on Public 
Administration Reform within EU Delegations – with the aim of shaping a more structured 
dialogue with the enlargement countries and ensuring political commitment and leadership 
in the reform process. 
Moreover, the role of the administrative capacity criteria within the EU enlargement 
agenda opens several questions about EU enlargement policy and, more generally, about the 
nature of the EU integration project and the system of governance that it generates. In fact, 
the absence of horizontal administrative rules within the main body of European legislations 
is not an accidental or contingent feature, but instead it is something that is deeply rooted in 
the sui generis nature of the EU system, directly deriving from the functional and incremental 
path that European integration has undertaken from its very beginning (Cassese 2003: 94-7). 
The ambiguous status of administrative power within the EU has, therefore, a prima face 
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impact on EU enlargement policy, by exacerbating the contrast between the requirements of 
technical and sectoral alignments to European policies – covered by the acquis – and more 
general transformative ambitions of the EU as a system of governance. 
The paper will address these issues in the following way. Section two presents EU 
competences and influence in relation to the administrative system of the member states. 
Section three describes the emergence of the administrative capacity criteria in the context of 
the 5th European Enlargement and the problem of definition of common administrative 
standards. Section four synthesizes the limits of the application of the administrative 
capacity criteria in the CEEBs. Section five describes how the accession of Croatia 
highlighted the necessity to renew the accession toolbox for improving administrative 
capacity in the Western Balkans. Section six introduces the administrative capacity criteria in 
the context of the new EU enlargement strategy. Section seven makes some concluding 
remarks. 
EU influence on the administrative system of the member states: An open debate 
The EU and its Member states have a very peculiar style of public administration and 
rules enforcement characterized by an “indirect implementation” of the vast majority of EU 
rules and norms by national authorities, that is balanced by several routes of European 
influence on national public administrations (Schwarze 1992; 1996). The cornerstone of this 
atypical architecture can already be found in Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome,2 establishing 
the principle of loyal cooperation between European and national authorities, which has 
been taken over, in a slightly modified form, by the Treaty of Lisbon (now Art. 4 par. 3 TEU). 
Article 5 represented a delicate compromise between the respect of national sovereignty and 
the necessity not to jeopardize the tasks and the goals pursued through European 
institutions. Not surprisingly, this article has been read in two diametrically opposite ways. 
On the one hand, it has been considered as a norm safeguarding the prerogatives of national 
executives, stating the Member States’ general competence for implementing Community 
Law (Lenaerts and Nuffel 1999: 392). On the other, it has been interpreted, in connection with 
the sanctioning powers of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and under the principles of 
effectiveness of EC law and non-discrimination, as opening a further breach of national 
autonomy, as a source of direct European influence on national administrative systems 
(Bieber and Vaerini 2004: 388). 
The arguments in favour of this second interpretation derive mainly from the important 
case law developed by the ECJ. While the development of secondary legislations by 
European legislative bodies tends to be sectoral and related to specific policy areas, the 
activity of the ECJ is by its very nature more general, establishing common principles that 
frame the interpretation of EU law. Acting in this way, the ECJ has established some 
common horizontal (non-sectoral) principles that are binding for national administrations, 
                                                     
2“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions 
of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty” (Art. 5 of the 
Treaty of Rome). 
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such as proportionality, non-discrimination, legitimate expectations, duty to give reasons, 
legal certainty and transparency (Schwarze 1992; 1996). 
However, in support of the first type of reading, we have to note that these common 
principles are very general and their implications for concrete policies are far from clear 
(Page 2003: 173). Moreover, if we compare the overall administrative and executive powers 
within the EU with the legislative and judicial ones, we have to note how their expansion has 
been limited and very cautious toward a field that has always been perceived, especially in 
continental Europe, as lying at the real core of national sovereignty3 (Cassese 2003: 94-7; 
Tuori 2010: 207ss). Not only does the direct implementation of European norms, such as in 
monetary policy or competition law, still represents an exception rather than the rule, but 
provisions within the EU Treaties with some implications for the Member States’ 
administrative systems are also very few.4 If we look at secondary legislations, we can 
observe that certain policy areas, such as common agricultural policy, environmental 
protection or electricity norms, require the creation of certain regulatory bodies by national 
authorities (Demmke 2002). However, EU secondary legislations with direct effect on the 
horizontal aspects of the national administrative system are rare. The most notorious 
exception is given by public procurement rules, which have established some kind of 
common European administrative rules that bind national regulatory authorities (Drijber 
and Stergiou 2009). 
The difference between these two interpretations is clearly very sharp, and it is not 
surprising that the topic has attracted increasing attention of many scholars studying 
Europeanization (Page and Wouters 1995; Knill 2001; Olsen 2003; Goetz 2001; Kassim 2003; 
Heidbreder 2011; 2014; 2015). Applied to the topic of the administrative power within the 
EU, the Europeanization research paradigm has been utilized by scholars to study the level 
of convergence between public administrations within the EU, asking whether it is possible 
to speak about the emergence of a European model of public administration, or we still 
witness the persistence of deeply differentiated national administrative systems. Moreover, 
the Europeanization literature has drawn attention to the existence of many types of mixed 
bodies within the EU system of governance, composed of both national and European 
officials – such as the various consultative bodies and Comitiology that have an important 
role in guarantying the continuity between legislative and administrative acts. This new 
brand of literature has also suggested how, within these governance bodies, informal rules, 
regular contacts, best practices and benchmarking could have an impact on shaping a 
European administrative space.  
                                                     
3 A good example of Member States’ resistance to the penetration of EU laws into national 
administrative systems is given by the fact that public administration had been exempted from the 
application of the provisions guarantying freedom of movement and non-discrimination of workers 
until 1980, when the European Court of Justice had imposed some limitations on this exemption 
(Ziller 1998). 
4Examples include, of course, the above mentioned Art. 4 par. 3 of TEU, especially in connection with 
the European Court of Justice’s power to sanction Member States that do not fulfil their obligations, 
Art. 2 of TEU on general principles of the EU, and Art. 197 of TEU on voluntary administrative 
cooperation. 
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This discussion has, however, failed until now5 to give final evidence to sustain that 
convergence among the administrative system of the member states is taking place or that a 
common European model of public administration is emerging (Heidbreder 2011; 2014; 
2015). While the EU has certainly had a growing impact on the development of national 
administrations, it seems that it has been just one among many intervening variables. In fact, 
marked differences still persist among public administration models of the EU Member 
States. 
The emergence of the administrative capacity criteria in the context of the 5th 
European Enlargement and the problem of definition of common standards 
Considering all the specificities that still characterize the administrative power within the 
EU system of governance, the late emergence of the administrative capacity criteria during 
the Fifth European Enlargement represented a real path breaking issue in EU enlargement 
policy, opening a new area of direct influence of the EU that is not traditionally associated 
with EU competences. Even if the sectoral administrative capacities of candidate countries 
have always posed some concern during previous EU enlargements, the introduction of a 
general assessment of the horizontal administrative capacities of the candidate countries 
represented a completely new issue in the enlargement process.  
The emergence of the administrative capacity criteria was an expression of both the 
scepticism of Western European countries and the European Commission towards the 
administrative structures of East European countries and the tightening of EU conditionality, 
mainly due to the increased complexity of EU policy making after the completion of the 
internal market and the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht. As highlighted by A. J. G. 
Verheijen (2000: 8), the main reasons for the introduction of the administrative capacity 
criteria can be summarized as follows: firstly, “Sectoral capacity cannot develop in isolation; 
even if capacities in key sectoral areas are brought up to the required levels, the effect of this 
will be at most temporary if the overall administrative system is not functioning effectively”; 
secondly, it was “important to guarantee that the European policy process will be able to 
function effectively with 27+ member states”. The introduction of these new criteria was 
therefore linked to the concerns of absorbing 12 new countries without disrupting the EU 
policy process. Especially the high heterogeneity of the potential new member states from 
Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic, with the legacy of their communist past, was seen as a 
serious threat to the politico-administrative system of the Union, in which national 
administrations have a crucial role in enforcing European rules, while the principles of loyal 
cooperation and mutual trust have a pivotal importance. 
The administrative capacity criteria was included only recently into the process of 
specification of the conditions for entering the EU. While the main conditions for new 
accessions had been formulated at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, at that time no 
explicit reference was made to the horizontal administrative capacity criteria. The so-called 
Copenhagen criteria included three fundamental groups of conditions: (1) the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
                                                     
5We have to keep in mind that ‘convergence’ has turned out to be a really multifaceted concept that 
renders difficult to take a final position on the issue (Pollitt 2001). 
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protection of minorities; (2) a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces within the internal market;  (3) the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership (European Council 1993). It is only with the conclusion of the 
Madrid European Council in December 1995 that it was made explicit, for the first time, that 
the horizontal administrative capacities of candidate countries would be assessed (European 
Council 1995). Afterwards, it was introduced as a criterion in its own right for the first time 
in the Commission Opinions of June 1997, and then started to appear regularly, from 
November 1998 onwards, in the Commission Regular Reports on Progress. 
From its very beginning, however, the assessment of the horizontal administrative 
capacity has encountered various problems in its application (Verheijen 2000; 2003; 
Dimitrova 2002; Bugarič 2006). The specific problems of the administrative criteria can be 
summarized in three main features: (1) the lack of administrative experience of the 
Commission; (2) elusiveness of the standards; and (3) the lack of a clear legal basis for EU 
intervention in national administrations. These are clearly three deeply interconnected issues 
deriving from the peculiar status of the administrative powers within the EU. In fact, the 
criteria for EU membership have always involved a sectoral approach implied in the chapter-
by-chapter negotiations, while there are no clear competences of the EU regarding public 
administration of the Member States. The Commission itself was lacking the necessary 
experience in this field, having always dealt with sectoral technical administrative 
requirements. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the administrative systems of the old member 
states represented a problem for defining common European standards for public 
administration. In other words, even after the decision to proceed with the assessment of the 
horizontal administrative capacities of candidate countries, the definition of European 
standards in this field proved to be an extremely elusive task.  
These problems have been partially mitigated by the intervention of SIGMA6 upon the 
request of the European Commission in the second half of the 1990s. The SIGMA programme 
is a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union, mainly funded by the EU, that 
came to play an intermediary role between the Commission and the candidate states in 
relation to the horizontal administrative capacities requirement. SIGMA had a fundamental 
impact on the definition of common standards by its twofold activity of elaborating the 
normative basis for administrative capacity criteria and operationalizing the administrative 
capacity criteria. 
Between 1998 and 1999, SIGMA published two important papers that elaborate the 
notion of “European Administrative Space” (EAS) (OECD 1998; 1999). Even though the EAS 
was initially recognized as just “a metaphor” (OECD 1999: 6) and it was openly stated that 
“no common agreement yet exists” (OECD 1999: 15) on common administrative law in the 
EU, the EAS soon appeared to be utilized by SIGMA as the fundamental notion in justifying 
and elaborating the administrative capacity requirements.7 In other words, within 
documents produced by SIGMA, the EAS soon became a synonym of “non formalized acquis 
                                                     
6 SIGMA stands for Support for Improvement in Governance and Management. 
7“Candidate countries will need to develop their administrations to reach the level of reliability of the 
European Administrative Space and an acceptable threshold of shared principles, procedures and 
administrative structural arrangements. There is a minimum standard of quality and reliability of 
public administration that candidate countries should attain” (OECD 1999: 15). 
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communautaire”, under a strong convergence hypothesis, representing “a common European 
general administrative law” (OECD 1999: 16). The EAS is presented as a systematization of 
some common administrative law principles – including reliability and predictability; 
openness and transparency; accountability; efficiency and effectiveness – that have 
progressively emerged through several driving forces “such as economic pressures from 
individuals and firms, regular and continuous contacts between public officials of Member 
States and, finally and especially, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice” (OECD 
1999: 6). 
In addition to giving a contribution to the normative justification and doctrinal 
elaboration of the administrative requirements, SIGMA has played an even more important 
role in the operationalization of the criteria. From the general explanation of the common 
European administrative law principles, SIGMA formulated a new system of baseline 
assessment for the definition of minimum standards for public administration. The SIGMA 
baseline assessment, which was elaborated in strict cooperation with the European 
Commission, identified six main areas involved in the horizontal administrative capacity 
assessment: civil service, policy-making and coordination, pubic expenditure management 
systems, public procurement, internal financial control and external audit. The introduction 
of the baseline assessment represented a fundamental tool in the elaboration of minimum 
standards and in promoting capacities in public administration of candidate countries, 
having a clear influence on Commission’s Reports from 1999 onwards (Verheijen 2000: 17-8). 
Even if the intervention of SIGMA presented clear limits in both its doctrinal elaborations 
and policy implications, the shortcomings seem to be related mainly to the ambiguities of the 
administrative power within the EU. The work of SIGMA represented therefore an 
important step towards a better definition of horizontal administrative requirements, 
marking the final stage for the specification of the administrative capacity criteria in the 
context of the Fifth European Enlargement. 
Convergence: A dysfunctional myth? The limits of the application of the 
administrative capacity criteria to CEEBs 
Despite the difficulties in shaping the administrative capacity criteria and the lengthy 
process of their specification, many reports have shown how EU conditionality had a clear 
impact on promoting reforms of the public administration in the Central East European and 
Baltic countries (CEEBs).8 This is not surprising, given the context of strong Europeanization 
that characterized the Fifth EU Enlargement, in which the influence of the European 
Commission went beyond its powers with regards to states already members (Grabbe 2006: 
                                                     
8While before 1997 only Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states had adopted some kind of legislations 
in this field, as a consequence of EU pressure all CEEB countries adopted new legislations between 
1997-2002, with Romania and Bulgaria continuing to adopt new pieces of legislation until their 
accession to the EU (as shown by various Reports of the Commission). The fact that all candidate 
countries adopted new laws in a relatively short period of time is a good indicator that suggests that 
EU conditionality indeed had an impact. Moreover, as highlighted by Dimitrova, even if the reaction 
of the countries were not the same, the contents of the new legislations were quite similar and the 
influence of the European principles quite clear (Dimitrova, 2005: 81). 
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52-4). Nevertheless, it was at the same time clear how the exercise of EU conditionality in this 
field has been far from unproblematic. In fact, countries reacted differently to this specific 
part of EU conditionality, showing different degrees of internalization of European 
principles of public administration as defined by the Commission and SIGMA. By the end of 
the process many shortcomings and dysfunctionalities emerged in the ways the 
administrative requirement had been applied, in the types of effects that it had exercised 
and, especially, in the long-term sustainability of the reforms that had been promoted 
through EU conditionality. 
What lies at the very core of the strategy adopted by the Commission and SIGMA is the 
reform of the civil service, that should be the first step in promoting horizontal 
administrative capacities and in this way a catalyzer for other reforms (Ziller 1998; Verheijen 
2000; Dimitrova 2005). The Commission strongly insisted on adopting new legislation in this 
field, with the aim of creating a reliable civil service characterized by professionalism, 
neutrality and independence from the political system, in line with the classic continental 
Rechtsstaat tradition, marginalizing other available models such as New Public Management 
(Bugarič 2006: 218). The rationale behind this choice of the Commission and SIGMA can be 
explained by the specific strategy to deal with post-communist administrations, which 
appeared very dysfunctional in the pre-accession period, where the public services seemed 
characterized by strong influence of political parties, lack of mobility of the personal, low 
salaries and poor social considerations (Bossert and Demmke 2003; Verheijen 1995; 2003).9 
While it is quite difficult to accurately describe the model that was sponsored as a simple 
derivation from the common administrative principles of the EU and its member states, this 
strategy aimed to stabilize the administrative structures of CEEB countries and guarantee 
their regularity and predictability. This was perceived as a necessary alignment with the rule 
of law tradition and, therefore, was considered a fundamental precondition for performing 
adequately, and in a reliable manner, within the EU system. Moreover, the success of this 
kind of reform should have helped to reach a better definition of the state-society 
relationship, offering a solid base for further efforts of modernization that could also be open 
to more managerial types of arrangements. 
However, the results of EU conditionality in this field fell far behind this ambitious 
approach. As shown by several reports and various scholars,10 new legislations have been 
                                                     
9In fact, the ambiguous legacy of the recent communist past was working in a twofold way. On the 
one hand, during the previous regime, there was no clear separation between state and society, and no 
specific law distinguishing public and private employment. Within this context, public administration 
was under direct and strict control of the political system, working as a fundamental instrument of 
oppression and leaving a strong lack of political neutrality in the CEEB countries’ administrative 
culture (König 1992; Verheijen 1995). On the other hand, the first reaction to the communist legacies 
during the early transition period was dominance of anti-statist and neoliberal ideology that gave 
priority to liberalization, deregulation and privatization, underestimating the role of the state and 
marginalizing reforms in this field (Verheijen 2003: 490). As a consequence, during the early transition 
period, the reform of public administration was not considered a priority on the reform agenda, with 
the only exception of Hungary that adopted a Civil Service law already in 1992. 
10 Evidence about the limited impact of EU conditionality in this field derives from SIGMA 
assessments and documents and EU regular reports, but is also almost unanimously stated within 
secondary literature. 
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often lacking of successive implementation and the overall approach seemed to be too 
legalistic. Instead of seeing the adoption of a new law as a starting point for a broader 
strategy of reform of the public administration, the adoption of new civil service legislations 
seemed to have become a goal in itself. Moreover, the problem of politicization looked far 
from being resolved; on the contrary, the various plans for reforming the public 
administration often became themselves the expression of new waves of politicization, with 
the ruling political parties suspending the previous reform programs in order to launch their 
own initiatives (Mayer-Sahling 2004: 98).  At the end of the negotiations with the candidates, 
the Commission’s final reports highlighted the huge gap between legislation and 
implementation, asking for more efforts in this regard. 
Other important areas covered by EU initiatives were the promotion of new training 
programs and the re-organization of policy-making and coordination, including the 
development of dedicated structures for the management of EU affairs. Given the context 
described above, it is not surprising that the results have been quite limited also in these 
fields. As reported by Verheijen (2000), even if a large number of training schools and 
institutes were established, the results had been quite modest. Among the main problems in 
carrying forward these initiatives were financial constraints, low priority, the reluctant use of 
training as an element of reform programs and a generally negative experience with 
‘imported’ training. At the same time, as far as the re-organization of the policy-making and 
coordination is concerned, it was the field in which SIGMA and the Commission’s 
assessments were the most negative. At the end of the negotiations, the policy-making and 
implementation processes of CEEBs still had many features of the previous system, such as 
top heavy co-ordination, duplication of functions and lack of clearly defined accountability 
structures. While the dedicated structures for the management of EU affairs were judged 
sufficient for transposing the acquis, strong concerns were expressed regarding the ability of 
the public administration of the new member states to work within the EU policy system. 
However, the most negative feature that emerged from these initiatives was the lack of 
sustainability of the reform of the public administration. In fact, at the time of accession the 
Commission’s Comprehensive Monitoring Reports highlighted the necessity to continue with 
reform initiatives, without effectively having at work, within the EU, any type of instrument 
to influence the development of public administration once a country has obtained EU 
membership. As shown by Meyer-Sahling in a SIGMA paper on the sustainability of civil 
service policy in the eight CEEBs five years after accession (Meyer-Sahling 2009),11 there has 
been a high discrepancy between pre-accession and post-accession policy. With the only 
exception of Lithuania – and all Baltic states, with some qualifications, that continue with the 
pre-accession path – all the other countries have shown a policy reversal. On the one hand, 
Hungary and Slovenia presented “constructive reform reversals”, since new reform 
initiatives took place after accession but without the general framework provided by the 
Commission and SIGMA, leading to an increasing gap with respect to European principles. 
Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, are classified as countries with 
“destructive reform reversals”. In this case, all three countries dismantled the reforms of the 
civil service that were initiated before accession without providing a policy reorientation. 
                                                     
11 See also Meyer-Sahling 2011. 
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Overall, the results in the application of the administrative capacity criteria in CEEBs 
have been, at best, modest. Several factors interfered in mitigating the effect of EU 
conditionality. Firstly, the late introduction of administrative criteria and the lack of clarity 
on the standards substantially slowed down the process, leaving little space for the 
implementation of new legislation. Secondly, EU conditionality in this field has been weak. 
On the one hand, horizontal administrative requirements never reached high priority on the 
agenda of the Commission, with limited EU funds dedicated to the construction of a better 
public administration. On the other, the threat to deny membership to a candidate country 
on the basis of its lack of administrative capacities was not credible. A third negative factor is 
the lack of domestic ownership of these reforms, since they were strongly dependent form 
external stimuli. The results obtained by EU conditionality in this field did not reach a 
sufficient degree of internalization and institutionalization before accession and remained 
locked in the domestic domain. Given the lack of powers of the EU in this field, the 
administrative developments after EU accession, diverging often from the European 
principle of public administration, seemed to depend almost exclusively from internal 
political constellations. 
From this perspective, however, what appears more problematic is the nature of EU 
intervention in this field. The efforts made by the Commission and SIGMA to construct the 
horizontal administrative requirements as a sort of “non formalized acquis communautaire”, 
implying a strong convergence hypothesis, does not seem to have contributed to major 
clarity and success of EU conditionality in this field. During accession negotiations, the 
process of approximation of a candidate country to the acquis communautaire implies a 
specific status. After accession the acquis becomes part of the domestic legal order of a 
member state, and the specific goals of functional integration that are covered by EU laws 
turn out to be deeply plugged in the ordinary functioning of the State. This is clearly not so 
in the case of administrative standards, in relation to which not only there is no 
administrative acquis, but the existence of informal rules leading member states’ public 
administrations towards convergence seems to be problematic. This opens the question 
whether it wouldn’t have been better to have openly thematized EU requirements for public 
administration as an effort of external assistance to institution building and state 
consolidation, rather than as an approximation to common European standards.  
The administrative capacity criteria in the Western Balkans: The accession of 
Croatia and the necessity to renew accession toolbox 
After its emergence and application through soft conditionality during the 5th European 
enlargement, the administrative capacity criteria have rapidly gained importance with the 
EU enlargement process reaching the Western Balkans, receiving an even greater attention 
during the accession of Croatia and becoming today, together with the rule of law and 
economic governance, one of the three pillars of the new EU enlargement strategy (European 
Commission 2014). The rising importance of the administrative capacity criteria within the 
agenda of the Commission can again be seen as an expression of both stronger political 
conditionality utilized by the EU to address the specificities of the Western Balkan region, 
and the result of the experience that was gained during the previous enlargements. More 
generally, the approximation of the EU enlargement policy to the Western Balkans seemed to 
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generate a dilemma between stability and efficiency, requiring a serious adjustment in the 
EU “accession toolbox”. As noted by Tanja A. Börzel,  “On the one hand, the EU has offered 
the Western Balkans a membership perspective to stabilize the region and overcome 
problems caused by weak and contested statehood. On the other hand, it is the limited 
statehood of Western Balkan countries which undermines their compliance with EU norms 
and rules” (Börzel 2011: 5). Within this context of limited statehood that has, in different 
ways, characterized all the countries of the region, the efforts made by the Commission to 
give today a central role to the administrative capacity criteria seems to represent a 
fundamental part of a reorientation of the EU enlargement policy. 
The limits of the “old approach” in relation to the Western Balkans emerged clearly 
during the process of negotiations and accession of Croatia. Even if stronger political 
conditionality was applied to Croatia (Bojinović and Urlić 2015)12 and some efforts were 
made to renovate the EU enlargement strategy, the innovations of the overall approach have 
been quite limited, since the accession strategy that the Commission has followed seemed to 
be largely on the path of the 5th EU enlargement. In relation to the administrative capacity 
criteria, the EU decided to put a greater emphasis on addressing administrative reforms from 
the early stage of the accession process and the EU and SIGMA provided extensive support 
to Croatia’s public administration reform. However, the final result was limited in terms of 
its wider impact and sustainability. Although EU conditionality did have some impact, as 
illustrated by several pieces of legislation, such as the General Administrative Procedures 
Act (Groß and Grimm 2014), or in establishing new training structures, such as the National 
School for Public Administration, at the end of the negotiation process in 2011 the Croatian 
public administration still appeared rather weak. 
The vicissitudes of the Strategy of State Administration Reform can be seen as really 
emblematic of the difficulties that Croatia has faced in producing a comprehensive review of 
its administrative structures. After a period of fragmented Europeanization of public 
administration that started in 2001 with the signing of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, Croatia adopted a new Strategy of State Administration Reform in 2008, a general 
framework that was to produce a final effort of modernization before accession (Koprić 2008; 
2011). However, the strategy suffered of considerable weaknesses. In fact, the strategy was 
adopted by the Government but not by the Parliament, it appeared to be highly normative 
without clear indicators for its monitoring and implementation, and it did not include a 
financial plan. Whereas a special body to watch over the implementation of the strategy was 
established in autumn 2008 – the National Council for Evaluation of State Administration 
Modernisation – it was dissolved in summer 2009 (Koprić 2011). At the end of the negotiations 
period the implementation of the strategy had been quite limited, since the Croatian 
authority simply announced that the “implementation of the Strategy was satisfactory”, but 
without providing any data sustaining such a statement (as reported by SIGMA baseline 
assessment of 2011, OECD 2011: 8).  
                                                     
12Including post-conflict resolution and cooperation with other international institutions such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Council of Europe in relation with 
minority rights and the Regional Cooperation Council with respect to regional post-conflict 
cooperation and reconciliation. These additional conditions are being applied to all the Western 
Balkan countries. 
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The difficulties of Croatia in consistently implementing the public administration reform 
strategy show very clearly some of the weaknesses of the current EU approach that affect all 
the countries of the region, primarily the problem of taking internal ownership of the reform 
initiative. Whereas a substantial improvement of administrative capacities was needed, the 
weakness of the administrative capacities and the internal fragmentation of powers biased 
the ability to adequately implement the strategy. More precisely, the Croatian case suggests 
three main groups of problems: (1) the problem of orientation, in terms of elaborating a 
credible long-term strategy; (2) the problem of motivations, given by low incentives and 
politicization of the administrative system; (3) and the problem of implementation, due to 
bureaucratic resistances and corruption. These difficulties exacerbate the problem of internal 
ownership that already was present in the CEEB countries, making the interplay between the 
external incentives and support provided by the EU and the internal actors very 
complicated. 
Moreover, we have to bear in mind that Croatia represents, together with Serbia, the 
frontrunner regarding its administrative capacities, that scores better in comparison to 
Macedonia or Albania, with Kosovo13 and Bosnia and Herzegovina being at the very bottom 
(Elbasani 2008; 2012; Börzel 2011). In different ways all these countries have suffered of 
limited statehood, that raises serious concerns about the decoupling between formal 
structures and rule-consistent behaviour. This problem of decoupling has been notoriously 
present also during accession of the CEEB countries (Grzymala-Busse 2004), but in a more 
moderate form. As stressed by Börzel, all CEEBs “suffered from weak capacities […] but 
were largely consolidated states” (Börzel 2011: 11). On the contrary, in the Western Balkans, 
the lack of administrative capacities is more pronounced and seems to derive from the 
fragility of state sovereignty in both its internal and external dimensions. This is translated, 
in more concrete terms, in a high malleability of internal formal institutions to external 
influences but a low degree of effectiveness of these rules, leading to a greater gap between 
the legal framework and informal praxis.  
From this perspective, the report written by Meyer-Sahling for SIGMA on Civil Service 
Professionalization in the Western Balkans (Meyer-Sahling 2012) illustrates the case rather well. 
On the one hand, Western Balkans countries have appeared to be very open to external 
influences and they outperform CEEBs civil service systems – all except Lithuania – in terms 
of their formal-legal alignment to the European principles of public administration (as 
defined by SIGMA), showing a medium-high level of fit. On the other hand, the main 
problem is the lack of rule effectiveness. In fact, despite this formal-legal alignment, the rules 
are poorly implemented, often failing to achieve the designed outcomes. All this seems to 
highlight a weakness of internal political agency in both dealing with the demands coming 
from external actors, which would easily penetrate the internal domain, and making internal 
rules effective. 
                                                     
13This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and 
the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 
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The New enlargement strategy and the administrative capacity criteria: The EU as 
a State builder in the Western Balkans? 
Given these difficulties, after the closing of the negotiations with Croatia the EU has 
undertaken a major transformation of its enlargement policy from 2012 onwards, producing 
in the arch of three years a general reorientation of its enlargement strategy (European 
Commission2012; 2013; 2014). Through its annual communications on the Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges, the European Commission has progressively shaped a new 
Enlargement strategy based on the three pillars: the rule of law, economic governance and 
public administration reform. In 2012, the Communication of the Commission has 
introduced a new approach to the rule of law by changing the negotiations framework for 
Montenegro and for future negotiating countries – this new framework is today applied also 
to Serbia that started negotiations in January 2014. The new framework strengthens political 
conditionality, overcoming the traditional way of opening of the negotiation chapters and 
giving priority to the chapters on judiciary and fundamental rights and justice, freedom and 
security, in order to put the rule of law at the core of EU enlargement policy. In 2013, a new 
strategy on economic governance and competitiveness has been formulated, strengthening 
the economic dialogue with enlargement countries. The new strategy introduces new 
mechanisms of coordination and preparation of national reform strategies, which now 
include both macroeconomic and fiscal programs and structural reforms. Finally, in 2014, a 
new approach on public administration reform has been introduced. 
The new three-pillars approach is characterized by a strong focus on fundamental 
reforms, that have to be addressed early in the enlargement process. It represents a clear 
effort to overcome the limits of EU policies in the past, especially those related to the 
fragmentation of chapter-by-chapter negotiations that has exposed EU power, exercised 
through conditionality, to high degrees of dispersion (Grabbe 2001). The new approach aims 
to strengthen the credibility of EU transformative power by elaborating a more holistic 
approach in which the strategy’s three pillars are clearly strongly interdependent, having a 
mutually reinforcing impact among themselves. The strengthening of the rule of law has an 
impact on economic development and on public administration. Effective, reliable and 
predictable legal and administrative systems represent the basic infrastructure for economic 
dynamism and for attracting foreign investment. And an open and efficient public 
administration that is capable of properly implementing political decisions and representing 
the rights of its citizens lies at the very basis of mutual trust between the rulers and the ruled, 
of political legitimacy and of democratic governance. 
One of the most significant features of the new EU enlargement strategy is its strong 
focus on horizontal aspects of candidate countries’ governance, which do not bear any 
particular relation with EU policies and functional integration. In other words, the three 
pillars approach focuses EU conditionality on pushing for reforms that could be desirable 
and pursued regardless of future effective accession to the EU by a candidate country, and 
that could be well framed also in terms of national interests. This of course does not mean 
that the strategy is not related to EU integration. However, despite the sometime alleged 
antagonism between European integration and national sovereignty, the new approach 
shows how a well functioning national system, capable of formulating national interests in a 
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coherent manner and implementing them consistently, represents a fundamental premise for 
EU membership.  
From this perspective, the central role of public administration reforms in the new EU 
strategy, that represents a fundamental step for empowering national public institutions, is 
not surprising. The high priority given to the administrative criteria aims to increase EU 
external push and internal ownership at the same time by making horizontal administrative 
requirements fundamental obstacles for accession and framing them in terms of national 
interest. 
Another important part of the strengthening of the EU external push has come from a 
further clarification of EU administrative requirements through a new SIGMA initiative to 
support the Commission – The Principles of Public Administration (OECD 2014). Through this 
initiative, the SIGMA has produced a renewed baseline assessment according to the six 
priority areas specified by the Commission, which include: strategic framework for public 
administration reform; policy development and coordination; public service and human 
resources management; accountability; service delivery; and public financial management. 
These SIGMA principles provide a new framework for both benchmarking performances – 
defining 19 key requirements of a functioning public administration – and providing a guide 
to local policy-makers in the reform process – shaping 48 key principles that focus on 
implementation, evidence based monitoring and performance of the system in practice.  
The introduction by both the Commission and SIGMA of a special focus on the strategic 
framework for public administration reform represents one of the main innovations of the 
new approach. It puts an unprecedented emphasis on the necessities of a political 
commitment and political leadership in candidate countries regarding the reform process, 
providing new means of technical coordination and a monitoring framework for the 
implementation of the reform strategies. Moreover, in order to shape a more structured 
dialogue with the enlargement countries, new Special Groups on Public Administration Reform 
have been introduced. The Special Groups on Public Administration Reform have already 
met in Albania, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, becoming part of the EU Delegation to these countries. These Special Groups on 
Public Administration Reform aim, in particular, to stimulate long-term political support and 
better coordination of reform initiatives at the local level. 
Overall, the new approach on public administration reforms aims to reinforce the 
credibility of EU transformative power and tries to overcome the shortcomings of the past by 
both strengthening EU external push and increasing local ownership and leadership of the 
reform process. The positive effects of the new approach have been evident in Serbia and 
Montenegro, the two countries of the region presently negotiating EU membership, as both 
countries have adopted new action plans for the implementation of the national public 
administration reform strategies by the end of 2014, in close cooperation with the Special 
Groups on Public Administration Reform within the EU delegations and SIGMA. However, 
the administrative capacity criteria do not address only countries actually negotiating EU 
membership, but all candidate and potential candidate countries, making EU conditionality 
today stricter, but more coherent than in the past. The fulfilment of the administrative 
capacity criteria is today one of the fundamental preconditions for entering the EU, in 
relation to which all Western Balkans countries have to conform if they want to proceed in 
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their path towards the EU; an underestimation of the administrative capacity criteria could 
substantially delay and jeopardize their possible accession. 
Concluding remarks 
After almost 20 years from its first introduction at the European Council of Madrid, the 
EU administrative capacity criteria passed a long way – from being a marginal criteria 
applied through soft political conditionality in the case of the CEEB countries, to 
representing a central requirement for EU membership that lies at the very core of EU 
enlargement policy. This transformation reflects both the experience acquired by the 
Commission during previous enlargements and the specificities of the new candidate 
countries in the Western Balkans. Today, the EU enlargement policy has overcome many of 
the shortcomings of the past, reinforcing the overall coherence of the approach. This reflects 
a substantial change in the nature of EU conditionality, since the traditional emphasis on 
technical alignments to the acquis communautaire has been progressively combined with a 
new emphasis on reinforcing the horizontal governance capacities of candidate countries. All 
this makes EU conditionality today stricter than in the past. Whether this reorientation of the 
EU enlargement policy will produce the desired results is very difficult to say for the 
moment. A lot will depend on how much the EU will insist on the modernization of national 
institutions as a necessary condition for accession, as such a requirement could substantially 
slow down the EU enlargement process. Ultimately, what will effectively happen will 
depend to a great extent on the political choice of the EU and its Member States: whether 
priority will be given to reinforcing the EU transformative power but with the risk of 
delaying accession, or to goals of stability and fast integration of the Western Balkan 
countries into the EU. 
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Nastanak i konsolidacija kriterijuma administrativnih 
kapaciteta  u okviru politike proširenja EU 
 
 
REZIME – Ovaj članak daje kritičku ocenu nastanka, razvoja i konsolidacije kriterijuma 
administrativnih kapaciteta za ulazak u Evropsku uniju (EU). Kriterijumi administrativnih kapaciteta 
su se prvi put pojavili prilikom petogprošrenja EU (2004-07) usled slabog političkog uslovljavanja, 
gde su kriterijumi imali ograničen uticaj. Kriterijum dobija na značaju u procesu pristupanja 
Hrvatske, pokazujući određene promene u politici proširenja EUu cilju rešavanja specifičnosti zemalja 
Zapadnog Balkana. Zaključak je da su ovi kriterijumi danas postali glavni deo nove strategije 
proširenja EU, predstavljajući stroge uslove koje treba da ispune sve zemlje kandidati ukoliko žele da 
nastave na svom putu ka EU. Ovo preusmeravanje predstavlja veliku promenu u prirodi politike 
proširenja EU. 
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